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Can Fictionalists Have Faith?1 
By Finlay Malcolm 
[forthcoming in Religious Studies] 
Abstract: According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary 
for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a ‘positive cognitive attitude’. This 
broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, 
including fictionalism. This paper shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-
doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating 
the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions in a discourse is of little 
consequence for fictionalists, whereas their truth matters deeply for the faithful. Although 
promising, this approach incurs several theoretical costs, hence providing a compelling reason to 
favour a purely doxastic account of faith. 
Introduction 
According to non-doxastic theories of faith (NDT), you don’t have to believe p to have faith 
that p. Rather, the cognitive component to one’s propositional faith may be satisfied by the 
“taking on” of a non-doxastic attitude. Typically, this attitude is adopted for pragmatic 
purposes – as a means to attain a particular goal. This can make it more appropriate to 
evaluate the rational status of faith on practical, rather than purely epistemic grounds, 
particularly if the proposition in question is not believed. These non-doxastic theories are also 
sometimes developed as general theories of propositional faith, rather than covering solely 
religious content. This enjoys the virtue of accounting for an important psychological attitude 
that has often been regarded distinctively religious in nature, but is actually held toward many 
different contents. 
There are some interesting prima facie similarities between NDT and other pragmatic 
approaches to a particular domain and, as I have jointly argued in a recent article (Malcolm 
and Scott (2016)), this is especially true of what we may call “revolutionary fictionalism”. 
The decision to adopt a cognitive attitude toward a proposition and to positively affirm it for 
pragmatic reasons, despite not believing it, is one also taken by the fictionalist. It seems as 
though at least some fictionalists meet the conditions often specified by NDT. This provides 
an interesting objection to the advocate of NDT: if you can’t entirely distinguish the two 
positions, then surely NDT becomes untenable.2 But why should this be the case? Why does 
fictionalism appear to be a counterexample to NDT? Even if NDT appears to grant faith to 
fictionalists, why should this “fictionalist-style counterexample” pose a problem for the 
advocate of NDT? 
1 This is an uncorrected pre-print version. When citing please use the final journal published version. 
2 The discussion of this issue is covered at the end of the article (i.e. Malcolm and Scott (2016), 14-
15). My statement of the objection here is paraphrased from the short introduction to this issue given 
in that paper. 
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The overall issue is only briefly introduced in the (2016) article, and it is the aim of 
this paper to take the problem further in two important respects: first, by showing precisely 
how fictionalists can have faith, and second, explaining why this is a problem for NDT. I then 
consider a promising response to this problem that was not addressed in the article, which is 
to distinguish NDT from fictionalism by the difference in importance that they each give to 
truth. Although the truth of the proposition in question is of no importance to the fictionalist, 
to the person with faith, it matters deeply whether the proposition is true. Whilst initially 
appealing, I will show how this response incurs a number of high theoretical costs for NDT. 
Given the problems raised by this issue of fictionalists having faith, I suggest we have a 
compelling reason to favour a doxastic account of faith over NDT. I will begin by 
summarising the conditions that are often specified for NDT, before directly addressing the 
issue of fictionalism. 
Non-Doxastic Theories of Faith 
What classifies as a “non-doxastic theory of faith”? There are many theories in the present 
literature that are unified in their rejection of belief as a necessary condition for faith. 
However, not all non-doxastic theories strictly concern propositional faith (‘strictly’ here in 
the sense that they solely aim to offer an account of faith as a propositional attitude).3 Some 
theories also include non-propositional and behavioural components to faith. For instance, 
Kvanvig’s (2013) account defines faith as an ‘orientation’ toward a ‘goal’ or ‘ideal’, and for 
Swinburne (2005), faith can be a matter of acting on certain ‘assumptions’, such as the 
proposition ‘there is a God’.4 Despite the fact that propositional faith is not the central 
component under analysis with all non-doxastic accounts, they don’t clearly exclude such an 
attitude, and so it may yet be possible to determine what this attitude would be on the theory. 
If that is so, then these sorts of accounts will still be included under the conditions for 
propositional faith that will be outlined presently. However, the analysis will only be 
necessary for the propositional component to the account. Of course, even those theories that 
focus specifically on propositional faith appear to come in a great variety. Despite this we 
needn’t interpret them as differing in kind, but rather by emphasis. Often, the accounts differ 
simply in terms of the preferred attitude specified to stand in place of belief, be it, for 
instance, imagination (Schellenberg (2014)), acceptance (Alston (1996)), acquiescence 
(Buchak (2012)), assumption (Howard-Snyder (2013)), etc. Provided the conditions for NDT 
are specified broadly enough, most, if not all of the existing accounts should meet those 
conditions. I propose, then, that we take a broad view as to which theories will come under an 
analysis of non-doxastic propositional faith, even if that analysis is not sufficient for the 
theory’s full account of faith, which may include other components, particularly those that 
are behavioural or fiducial. 
3 Perhaps the accounts that most straightforwardly deal with propositional faith are Howard-Snyder 
(2013; 2016), Buchak (2012; 2014), Schellenberg (2005; 2014), Alston (1996) and Audi (2011). 
However, this list is not exhaustive, and the proponents mentioned here also often provide accounts of 
other kinds of faith, or at least mention that there are other kinds. 
4 Also worthy of note are fiducial accounts such as Bishop (2007; 2014) and McKaughan (2013). 
3 
 
3 
 
Let’s begin, then, with the first condition, which has already been stated, in which 
faith that p requires “a positive cognitive attitude toward p”. Those attitudes that will meet 
this description must be cognitive, i.e. representational and truth-conditional, and positive, 
meaning that they involve a positive orientation towards the object of the proposition. 
Various kinds of volitional mental state can meet these requirements, such as those noted in 
the foregoing, and others that will include supposition, assent, affirmation, etc. A typical way 
to characterise the nature of these states is that to accept (assume, assent to, etc.) p is to take p 
as a premise in one’s practical reasoning. As such, one acts as if p, adopting a policy of going 
along with p in some or all of one’s deliberations (see Cohen (1992), 4). One family-
resemblance feature that these non-doxastic mental states all share is, therefore, that they can 
be adopted voluntarily, or at will. The mental state is “taken on” by the agent voluntarily. The 
family of non-doxastic attitudes offers a clear contrast with belief, which, of course, is also a 
positive cognitive attitude, but one that is not taken on voluntarily, but is formed without our 
(direct) volitional control.  
It is often claimed that outright disbelief that p is incompatible with a positive 
cognitive attitude that p (Audi (2011), 73). It’s uncontroversial that belief that p is rationally 
incompatible with disbelief that p. However, things are different when the attitude is non-
doxastic. In that case, the incompatibility referred to here is pragmatic rather than rational or 
logical. The reasoning behind this is that these non-doxastic attitudes are adopted in order to 
accomplish your practical aims, but this is not possible if you disbelieve that your aims can 
be accomplished. However, when we consider certain examples, this claim seems dubious. 
For instance, imagine that a lawyer believes her client is so obviously guilty that he stands no 
chance of being found innocent. In order to put her doubts aside and make a compelling case 
for his innocence she accepts that he’s innocent as a way of motivating herself to defend him 
passionately in court, and to pursue all the available avenues to find evidence proving his 
innocence. This looks both psychologically possible and prudentially advisable.5 
It looks as though a non-doxastic cognitive attitude is, then, compatible in a practical 
sense with outright disbelief in the same proposition. One can accept, imagine, or assent to p 
as a means to achieve one’s aims, even if one disbelieves p. It’s an important component of 
NDT, though, that propositional faith excludes disbelief. Given that my aims here are to 
faithfully represent this class of theories, I suggest that this claim is stated as an explicit 
condition within the analysis, rather than being entailed by the first condition. So, the second 
condition advocates of NDT ought to state is that for propositional faith, a subject must have 
“no outright disbelief that p”. Since I have rejected the argument in favour of this condition, it 
currently stands undefended, and I am aware of no further argument for it that exists in the 
NDT literature.6 As we will explore further in the next section, whether the condition is 
defensible is crucial for determining who has faith. 
 The two conditions outlined thus far are distinctly cognitive in nature, but faith is 
often thought to involve various non-cognitive components as well. Arguments for these are 
                                                 
5 This objection is also raised in Malcolm and Scott (2016, 12-13). 
6 In fact, the recent article by Howard-Snyder (2016) reiterates his support for this condition, without 
offering argument in its favour. He does give some arguments for it in his (2013) though, which are 
similar to the argument addressed in this section. 
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often developed from language. For instance, it sounds incongruous to say I have ‘faith that 
terrorism will succeed’ or ‘faith that we will lose the battle’. This is because our use of 
“faith” in these expressions typically conveys a positive evaluation if its object, and these are 
not propositions we tend to evaluate positively. We can elicit the same intuition for religious 
cases when considering instances of negative evaluation. For example, imagine someone who 
believes that God exists but despises this God, and dedicates her life to opposing those who 
are committed to God. While our character might rightly be described as a theist in virtue of 
her belief, it doesn’t appear appropriate to attribute her with faith. Perhaps the reason for this 
is that faith has a positive valence. There is a difference between the hateful theist and 
someone who loves, trusts and is wholly committed to God, and that difference is partly in 
terms of attitudes. In the former case, the theist believes that God exists, but has a negative 
evaluation of God. In the latter, the subject believes that God exists, but has positive affection 
for God, entailing a positive evaluation. Both subjects are theists, but whilst the first merely 
believes that God exists, we might say that the second has faith that God exists.7 Although 
this example suggests that one’s affections are the grounds of the positive evaluation, one 
needn’t have affection for the object of the proposition to evaluate it positively. For instance, 
I needn’t have affection for politics to have faith that politics can be a force for good – I 
could simply regard politics as a good thing. Nevertheless, often the evaluation will be 
grounded in affection. Hence, our third condition on propositional faith is that a subject must 
have “a positive evaluative/affective attitude toward p”. 
 I take the three conditions thus stated to be a fair representation of the propositional 
component in a broad range of non-doxastic theories. They are wide enough in scope to 
accommodate most or all of the various formulations, regardless of which component their 
advocate seeks to emphasise. According to NDT, then, a person S has faith that p iff S has: 
(1) a positive cognitive attitude toward p; 
(2) no outright disbelief that p; 
(3) a positive evaluative/affective attitude toward p. 
Note that this analysis accounts for propositional faith towards a content regardless of the 
domain, be it religious or not. So, one’s faith that democracy will succeed, faith that the 
marriage will last, or faith that we will make it home safely are all extensions of the same 
kind of propositional attitude, whose intension is specified by this analysis. NDT is therefore 
theoretically parsimonious – something often regarded as a theoretical virtue. 
When outlining (1) we saw that it can be satisfied either by non-volitional belief, or by 
a volitional non-doxastic state. In the former case, if we want to know why someone has 
come to have the belief, we might look to evidential considerations for an explanation. With a 
non-doxastic attitude, though, it’s not evidential, or any other epistemic considerations that 
explain one’s faith, but rather one’s practical concerns. Why would someone choose to 
voluntarily adopt an attitude towards a proposition that she does not believe? One answer is 
                                                 
7 Sometimes this argument is stated in terms of the distinction between the believing demons and the 
faithful, taken from the biblical passage in James 2:19. For instance, Plantinga claims that ‘The 
difference between believer and devil, therefore, lies in the area of affections: of love and hate, 
attraction and repulsion, desire and detestation’ (2000, 292). 
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given in my earlier example of the lawyer. She accepts that her client is innocent as a means 
to achieving the end of effectively defending his innocence. It’s widespread amongst 
accounts of NDT to draw analogies between examples of means-ends reasoning and 
propositional faith. For instance, Alston (2007, 133) famously draws comparison between his 
account of faith and an army general who, without having all the necessary information to 
hand to accurately disperse his troops, accepts the locations of the incoming enemy soldiers 
as a means to direct their movements. In the same way, Howard-Snyder (2013, 364) imagines 
a character, set out on a 2500 mile hike, who assumes that if he keeps going, he will 
eventually reach home, and does so as a means to motivate himself to get there. Both cases 
are distinctly pragmatist in nature, and are supposed to display examples of propositional 
faith. Richard Swinburne also endorses this approach, and articulates it for specifically 
religious cases: 
the faith needed for religion is basically a commitment to seek a goal…If you want 
the love of God for yourself and your fellows enough, you need to believe that there 
is quite a chance that there is a God and that it is more probable that you and your 
fellows will reach Him by following the Christian way (and assuming, not necessarily 
believing, the claims of the Creed) than by following any other way. (Swinburne 
(2001), 211-212)8 
Although this view of faith involves a behavioural component, it’s straightforward to see 
where the propositional attitude comes in. If your goal is to attain the love of God, part of 
reaching that end is by assuming propositions concerning God, and subsequently you will 
have the attitudinal component to this individual’s faith. 
 This pragmatist aspect to NDT is not explicitly stated in any of (1)-(3), but is rather in 
the background to how faith is construed on these accounts: it is part of the description of 
propositional faith, rather than being a prescription on it. In the final section I will show how 
explicitly stating this pragmatist component in the correct way will overcome the problem of 
fictionalist faith. However, I will also argue that construing faith as pragmatic in this way 
presents a number of theoretical problems for NDT. 
 
Revolutionary Fictionalism 
To understand fully the point raised in Malcolm and Scott (2016) – that fictionalists can have 
faith according to NDT – we must first outline what fictionalism is, and then explicitly show 
why the fictionalist can meet the conditions set out above. There are two predominant kinds 
of fictionalism: “hermeneutic” and “revolutionary”. The former is largely a descriptive thesis, 
which aims to tell us what our attitudes are towards a particular domain of discourse. The 
latter is normative, advising what stance one ought to adopt toward that discourse. The 
observation at hand only concerns revolutionary fictionalism (henceforth, “fictionalism”). 
As with propositional faith, one can be a fictionalist in many different domains. 
According to a typical view of fictionalism in some fields such as ethics (Nolan et al. (2005)) 
and mathematics (Leng (2005)), a fictionalist believes that the claims in a particular discourse 
                                                 
8 Note that by requiring you believe that there is ‘quite a chance that there is a God’, Swinburne’s 
account is in agreement with (2).  
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are literally false, but considers them worth uttering for instrumental purposes. With moral 
fictionalism for instance, one comes to believe that, for whatever reason, moral claims posit 
moral entities that do not exist, and so judges moral claims to be false (Mackie (1977)). 
However, this person might think that it’s nevertheless useful to continue to use moral 
discourse because of the positive impact it has on reinforcing one’s resolve toward behaving 
morally. Given this, the moral fictionalist adopts an attitude of acceptance towards those 
claims and positively applies them in everyday discourse. In the case of mathematics, even if 
one thought that there are no such things as mathematical entities, one might wish to retain 
the use of mathematical language due to the indispensability of quantification over numbers 
to our scientific theories. A religious fictionalism, then, would take religious claims at face-
value, but regard them as false. However, this would not prevent the practising fictionalist 
from ceasing to use religious language. Rather, she would see the benefits of continuing to 
use religious claims in her discourse, and may even find it beneficial to fully immerse herself 
in a religious tradition or set of practices in order to fully attain these religious benefits.9 
These benefits may be psychological, in the form of, say, existential comfort, or social, for 
instance, to retain one’s personal identity within a religious community. Fictionalism is 
therefore both a semantic theory, accounting for the meaning of one’s discourse, and a 
practical theory, advising on how one should engage with the discourse. 
 This description of the fictionalist does not have faith on NDT since she does not 
meet condition (2) (she believes claim p to be false). There are two ways to overcome this 
problem. First, we could attempt to reject (2). This may be fairly straightforward given the 
lack of arguments, to my knowledge anyway, that are offered in its defence. If we simply 
reject this condition, then disbelieving fictionalists would not be denied propositional faith on 
these grounds. However, in order to offer the strongest argument possible, I want to adopt a 
second approach, which shows how fictionalists can meet the conditions outlined by 
advocates of NDT without rejecting any of those conditions. To see this, we must simply note 
that not all fictionalist accounts are committed to disbelief,10 and hence, not all religious 
fictionalists must be atheists. Some only prescribe that even though one does not believe, as 
opposed to disbelieve, the claims within a discourse, one still ought to continue using those 
claims for instrumental gain. It’s open to us to adopt the following broader definition:  
Fictionalism: a (revolutionary) fictionalist does not believe the claims from a particular 
discourse, but accepts and utters them for purely instrumental purposes. 
It seems that the fictionalist who meets this definition can also meet condition (1) of NDT.  
Despite this overlap between the two theories, not every fictionalist will have 
propositional faith. Importantly, the fictionalist must not disbelieve the propositions in 
question (given (2)), and must evaluate them positively (given (3)). Yet there’s no reason to 
suppose that a fictionalist couldn’t meet these two requirements, and hence we ought to 
attribute propositional faith to those fictionalists that do. In fact, it will be the case that all 
                                                 
9 For an early account see Le Poidevin (1996). A useful recent article that contrasts several different 
approaches is Deng (2015), and some current theoretical development on fictionalism is given in Jay 
(2014; 2016. The latter also addresses NDT). 
10 A version of agnostic revolutionary fictionalism about science is given by van Fraassen (1980). 
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fictionalists satisfy (3) since the reason they accept and utter claims from the domain is 
because they regard them as good or beneficial in some way – because they evaluate them 
positively. I suggest that where an individual falls into the space between the two theories 
that we have someone who meets the conditions for NDT and the definition of revolutionary 
fictionalism. In effect, we have a “fictionalist with faith”. Had it been the case that I opted to 
reject (2), which I see no reason to retain, there will be an entire overlap between the two 
theories.  
Let’s consider an example of someone from the religious domain who I propose falls 
into this crossover space.  
Sam grew up in a Christian family who taught her all of the central claims of the Christian 
worldview, which she subsequently came to believe. She attended church services, prayer 
and worship events and bible studies. She grew a deep affection for God and found the 
Christian narrative of salvation to be definitive of her personal identity. At an older age, 
Sam began to engage critically with Christianity and believed she found some significant 
flaws with it as a consistent and logical system of ideas. Moreover, she started to recognise 
greater moral issues with God’s commands, and increased hypocrisy from Christian’s 
themselves. This coincided with issues of personal loss, and a heightened recognition of the 
weight of suffering and pain in the world. Although she retained her affection for the 
Christian story, she began to wonder if that is all that it is – a fictional narrative – and her 
love for it similar to those stories that she enjoys reading, but knows are not true. Feeling 
the pull of these considerations but unwilling to reject Christianity altogether as false she 
becomes agnostic, and determines that she will pursue her religion purely because it brings 
her great spiritual comfort. Leaving the religious community and ceasing to make religious 
claims could have a disastrous impact on her given that her identity is so bound up in these 
claims. She commits to continuing to make religious claims and affirmations in religious 
discourse, and accepts those claims despite not believing them. In order to get the most out 
of using her religious discourse, she decides to remain immersed in the religious 
community – practising alongside those who still profess belief. Even though her ends are 
now focussed on enjoying the benefits of religious engagement in this life, rather than on 
the worship of a God she once believed in, Sam’s means remain the same as ever. 
The character in this narrative appears, prima facie, to meet the generic definitions of both 
fictionalism and NDT. It isn’t clear that either camp should stake the sole claim over Sam’s 
practices and commitments. 
Despite this appearance though, perhaps Sam will not count as having faith on some 
particular accounts of NDT. For instance, a non-doxastic faith theorist might wish to 
construe the kind of acceptance involved in her theory as context-relative in a way that takes 
into account the epistemic reasons for engaging in the domain.11 This might appear to rule out 
fictionalists like Sam from having faith who only take into account practical concerns, and 
there may be other nuances that particular theorists have that work in a similar way.  
                                                 
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this objection, and raising the example of 
acceptance for epistemic reasons, which the reviewer attributes to Michael Bratman’s (1992) version 
of acceptance. 
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However, even fairly nuanced accounts of NDT seem susceptible to the fictionalist 
challenge. For instance, in the present example of acceptance for epistemic reasons, it’s likely 
that the kinds of fictionalists we are considering wouldn’t engage in their acceptance, with all 
that it entails, without having some positive epistemic reasons for thinking that the 
propositions they accept are quite plausible (even though they’re not strong enough to yield 
belief). The reason for this is because our fictionalists are agnostic, and this might be the case 
because they see the evidence as roughly balanced (although more on this presently). 
Moreover, it might be quite unattractive to accept propositions that we expect will be 
completely false, and this will be true for fictionalists too. Consider a scientific fictionalist 
who accepts the existence of quarks. If she had no epistemic reason for thinking that quarks 
might exist then she probably wouldn’t do so. She needn’t have conclusive evidence that 
quarks exist to make accepting their existence advisable, but if she believed outright they do 
not exist, perhaps we wouldn’t recommend that she keeps using them in her discourse. 
These epistemic considerations may also provide another point of contrast between 
NDT and fictionalism, when we bear in mind that some accounts of NDT claim that the 
reason the individual does not believe the proposition in question is because she regards the 
evidence for and against to be roughly equal. This is usually construed in terms of the claim 
that a person with faith can be in doubt about whether p, where ‘to be in doubt about whether 
p is for one neither to believe nor disbelieve p as a result of one’s grounds for p seeming to be 
roughly on a par with one’s grounds for not-p’ (Howard-Snyder (2013), 359). In that case, 
her doxastic attitude towards p simply tracks the available evidence she has for p and this is 
thought to result in suspension of judgment. The fictionalist, on the other hand, is perhaps 
less affected by evidential concerns, and so needs not take the evidence on either side to have 
such parity. But why not? Is it essential that the fictionalist’s doxastic states are not properly 
evidence-responsive? Not in the way I understand it, nor have construed it. Granted the 
fictionalist need not see the evidence as equally balanced, but neither must the non-believing 
person with faith. It would seem far-fetched to insist that the person with non-doxastic faith 
must be in this state. Both the fictionalist and faithful could have credences that do not quite 
fit with the evidence, perhaps in virtue of their desires and affections. Where a fictionalist 
responds to evidence with disbelief, there I have admitted that she fails to have faith, on 
NDT, unless (2) is rejected. But a fictionalist may see the evidence as roughly equal, or she 
may not, and her doxastic states will rationally adjust as appropriate, or they may not. 
However, all of this seems just as true for the person with non-doxastic faith. 
As for other kinds of nuanced accounts of NDT (whatever these may be), if the 
account is so particular that it really does exclude fictionalists then it will likely also specify 
necessary conditions that fall outside of even the broad-scope conditions given in the above 
generic analysis. This might then entail that the other theories that do not meet those 
conditions are false, and so would take some impressive arguments to be persuasive. If such a 
theory is constructed solely to deal with the fictionalist problem then it may appear ad hoc. 
Moreover, fictionalism is quite a broad and generic theory, and as we have seen with the prior 
example of acceptance for epistemic reasons, it is flexible enough to fit into many different 
specifications, regardless of the particular nuances on the theory that its author identifies. 
Suppose we’re content for now, then, that Sam is, or seems to be a “faithful 
fictionalist”. Is there any real problem with this? Why not simply accept that some 
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fictionalists have faith? To see why this may be problematic, let’s consider a remark recently 
made by Daniel Howard-Snyder, who is one advocate of NDT. At one point in his article, 
Howard-Snyder applauds Alvin Plantinga for distinguishing his account of belief in God – 
which he takes to offer an argument in favour of a doxastic account of faith – from various 
radical approaches to religion, including fictionalism: 
Plantinga writes these words in the context of a lament over the state of contemporary 
theology, which he finds steeped in the deplorable influence of religious non-
cognitivists such as Richard Braithwaite and religious fictionalists like Gordon 
Kaufmann, John Hick, and Don Cupitt. I join him in that lament. However, non-
cognitivism and fictionalism couldn’t be further from our concerns. (Howard-Snyder 
(2016), 156) 
As Howard-Snyder’s remarks make clear, he does not consider fictionalists to be attributed 
with faith on his version of NDT. But if his version of NDT is encapsulated by (1)-(3), and 
the fictionalist appears, prima facie, to satisfy (1)-(3), then the fictionalist does meet Howard-
Snyder’s NDT. So, why think that fictionalists do not have faith? Let’s consider a few 
reasons for why this might seem to be the case. 
The first reason might be theoretical. After all, these are two quite different 
approaches to one’s engagement within a particular domain. Fictionalism is primarily a 
theory about the meaning of our utterances within that domain (although, of course, built into 
this theory are claims about how the fictionalist uses discourse to express her attitudes and 
mental states concerning the domain’s content). NDT, on the other hand, is concerned with 
our mental states towards various propositions. It would certainly be theoretically rewarding 
to determine what distinguishes the two positions. Given that, as Howard-Snyder claims, 
fictionalism cannot be further from the concerns of advocates of NDT, then, perhaps the 
appearance of a crossover between the two theories is no more than a mere appearance, and it 
would be nice to know how to fully pull them apart. 
However, there is a more pressing, related issue at hand, which ought to motivate the 
advocate of NDT to ensure that the two theories are actually distinct. For, if the appearance is 
not simply a mere appearance, but an actual overlap between NDT and fictionalism, then 
what prevents the accusation that advocates of NDT are simply describing fictionalism by 
some alternate route? “Faith without belief” might just as well be called “fictionalism”. Do 
we actually just have on our hands two ways of naming the same phenomena? If so, this 
threatens to make NDT redundant – to collapse into a kind of fictionalism – and the residue 
left of NDT would just be instances of doxastic faith. But this simply leaves us with a 
doxastic account on one hand, and fictionalism on the other. The threat of redundancy gives a 
reason to determine what makes NDT distinct from fictionalism. 
Even if you are not convinced by this concern, it still seems as though fictionalists can 
satisfy (1)-(3) without seeming like cases of genuine faith. Why shouldn’t they? What guides 
the intuition that fictionalists do not have faith? Well, for one thing, fictionalists are engaged 
in a pretence.12 With her affirmation of claims from a discourse, the fictionalist is merely 
                                                 
12 For instance, Nolan et al. construes fictionalism about a discourse as that which ‘takes certain 
claims in that discourse to be literally false, but nevertheless worth uttering in certain contexts, since 
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pretending in her attitudes towards such claims. A fictionalist with faith, then, would simply 
be pretending to have faith, and as such, would not have faith. If she did have faith, then she 
wouldn’t need to pretend to have faith. According to NDT, though, the person who satisfies 
(1)-(3) is not pretending to have faith that p, but actually has faith that p. What we are left 
with is an incongruous result. The fictionalist both has faith and does not have faith. So, 
fictionalism as a pretence position shows that, whilst NDT may well be necessary, it isn’t 
sufficient for faith since it cannot individuate pretence positions from those that are genuine. 
 There are also more practical concerns facing the advocate of NDT. For instance, you 
might not want your theory to grant faith to certain radical positions. Advocates of NDT may 
feel this gives faith too broad a scope. From the remarks quoted above, we can see that 
clearly Howard-Snyder does not think that fictionalism is a positive influence on theology. 
Unfortunately, the reasons for this are not stated. So, whilst we can only speculate as to why 
this is the case for Howard-Snyder, for some, faith in the religious domain at least carries 
certain soteriological implications. In Christianity, there is such a thing as “saving faith”, and 
it might be thought that there is something both sincere and genuine about this kind of faith 
which, perhaps, is not equally to be found in radical approaches like fictionalism.  
Of course, this problem of salvation is mostly restricted to the religious domain. But 
there are problems with fictionalism for non-religious faith too. Notably, if we grant that the 
fictionalists, who are engaged in a form of pretence, can actually concurrently have faith, 
then perhaps non-doxastic faith in general also involves pretence. After all, if you don’t 
believe something but merely act as if you do, how can you avoid the claim that you are 
merely pretending? If advocates of NDT can show how their belief-less faith is different from 
the position of the fictionalist, they may be able to show how their faith is genuine and not 
merely a form of pretence. The issue of pretence highlights what is perhaps most 
objectionable about fictionalism for advocates of NDT: that fictionalism is pursued for the 
wrong kinds of reasons, reasons relating to one’s own interests, rather than being properly 
guided towards a possible truth that one values highly – perhaps more highly than anything 
else. It is this issue that I will take up further in the final section. 
These theoretical and practical concerns jointly motivate an attempt to overcome the 
situation at hand because if they cannot be overcome, then a purely doxastic account of faith 
might seem more favourable than a non-doxastic account. It’s worth noting a third reason as 
well for distinguishing the two positions, though not one that favours one over the other. If 
the two positions do come together, then NDT imposes faith on the fictionalist who might not 
want to have faith. The fictionalist might want to be distinguished from those in the 
community of the faithful, and wouldn’t be pleased with advocates of NDT who insist that 
she isn’t, and that only disbelief (or atheism for religious cases) will properly set her apart. It 
might be objected here that simply not wanting to be considered a particular kind of person is 
not appropriate motivation for altering our concepts. For example, just because some people 
might not like to be considered racist, that shouldn’t give them reason to alter how we define 
racism. We can grant this and still wonder whether, in fact, NDT really imposes faith on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the pretence that such claims are true is worthwhile for various theoretical purposes.’ (2005, 308, 
emphasis added) 
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fictionalist. There might be something that we’re missing – something already part of the 
general description of NDT that needs stating explicitly in the analysis. 
Note that the earlier practical and theoretical concerns apply equally even if the 
fictionalists we claim have faith are only of the non-believing, rather than of the disbelieving 
variety.13 In the first case, there is still a theoretical problem of NDT being assimilated under 
fictionalism, and in the second, pretence is still the position of the fictionalist. Mere lack of 
belief rather than disbelief does not change the fact that the fictionalist is pretending – only 
belief can do that. The fictionalist, whether or not she disbelieves or merely lacks belief, still 
maintains a commitment to affirming claims within a particular domain for what might be 
seen like the wrong kinds of reasons. 
 Now, with these motivations at hand, in the final section let’s compare two possible 
solutions to the problem of distinguishing faith from fictionalism. 
 
Distinguishing Faith From Fictionalism 
There are at least two ways to overcome this problem. First, and quite simply, we can adopt a 
doxastic account of faith by rejecting (1). In that case, (1) would read: “a belief that p”. 
Believing the propositions in the domain in question would categorically exclude all 
fictionalists. Second, we can add something to the analysis that holds for faith but not for 
fictionalism. One fairly plausible inclusion is that the truth of the proposition in question 
matters to the person with faith, whereas it does not for the fictionalist.14 Presumably, only the 
second option will be of interest to the advocate of NDT.  
 How, then, does truth purportedly distinguish faith from fictionalism? Well, it’s 
certainly part of the definition of fictionalism that the truth of the propositions the fictionalist 
accepts bears no consequence on whether she engages in the discourse. The value that the 
fictionalist sees in accepting and applying those propositions in her discourse in no way 
depends upon whether or not they are true. This same point might not hold for the person 
with faith. Suppose that someone badly wants to win in a race and has “non-doxastic faith” 
that she will win, despite not believing that she can win. So, she accepts that she can win the 
race in order to spur herself on to win it. If she was able to learn, say, by somehow seeing 
into the future, that she will not win the race no matter how hard she tries, this fact seems 
important to her, and it may well affect whether she continues to accept that she will win it. 
She may even cease to engage in the race altogether. In the religious domain, suppose 
someone is able to learn that the proposition “God exists” is categorically false.15 Presumably, 
for the person of faith, this would radically alter her attitudes and behaviour, such that she 
would no longer adopt a positive cognitive attitude towards that proposition, and would cease 
to commit to acting as though it were true. The claim being made here is that if the person 
with faith discovered that what she has faith toward is false, this discovery would be critical 
                                                 
13 Thanks to an anonymous referee for querying this point. 
14 I am indebted to Daniel McKaughan for in-depth discussions of this option. He has argued for this 
point himself at The Nature of Faith conference, St. Louis (2014). 
15 We could see this as equivalent to asking someone the counterfactual: if it were the case that God 
does not exist would you continue with your commitments to God? 
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for whether she would continue with her cognitive commitment, whereas for the fictionalist, 
this would be of no real importance.16 
Although the significance of truth does appear to mark a clear distinction between the 
two positions, it’s hard to say for certain whether this claim is accurate because this is an 
empirical claim that we currently lack any evidence for. Who’s to say, for example, that 
many people with faith in the religious domain wouldn’t simply carry on as normal if they 
found out that God does not exist? The benefits of religious engagement for those people 
might outweigh disengagement, even upon discovering that the religion’s major premises are 
in fact false. The same applies to the runner in the race. We can’t say for sure whether she 
would cease her cognitive commitment. She may be motivated to retain it for other reasons, 
say, due to the support she has received from family and friends. In both cases, it’s not 
necessary that one’s cognitive commitments will turn on the truth or falsity of the 
propositions one has faith toward. 
 Perhaps what needs to be done to defend this claim is to determine why someone with 
faith would cease her cognitive commitments upon learning their falsity. One reason for this 
may be instrumental. So, if propositional faith involves a pragmatic component in which one 
adopts a cognitive attitude in order to attain certain goods, then we can see that the truth of 
the proposition is necessary for the faithful person’s practical aims to be achieved. However, 
if someone then discovered that the proposition is false, the person who continues with a 
cognitive commitment toward the object of that proposition might not be aptly described as a 
person with faith. In fact, in that case, “fictionalism” may be one way to describe the position 
that the person has adopted, or indeed perhaps pretence. A restatement of the first condition 
would then be: 
(1*) a positive cognitive attitude toward p, adopted as a means to attain certain goods. 
The attainment of goods is the reason why the truth matters to the person with faith. If she 
knew the proposition were false, she wouldn’t adopt the attitude because she would then 
know that by doing so she wouldn’t be able to acquire the relevant goods. Moreover, this sort 
of definition appears to be in the background to many accounts of NDT, particularly in the 
examples given by Swinburne, Alston and Howard-Snyder. Each pragmatic example 
involved an individual who adopted the attitude in order to reach some goal or acquire some 
good. 
 Although promising, (1*) will not rule out fictionalists, who clearly also wish to adopt 
certain goods by their engagement with a particular discourse. The religious fictionalist, for 
instance, accepts and affirms religious claims for instrumental reasons – she wants to use the 
discourse as a means to retain a sense of spiritual comfort and personal identity. So, (1*) does 
not exclude fictionalists from faith. However, there is a response open to the advocate of 
NDT that resolves this concern, but only for instances of religious faith. At this point I will 
branch off from discussing faith regardless of the domain, to faith solely in religious content. 
The reason why will be made clear in the ensuing, and the costs of doing so will affect the 
overall account.  
                                                 
16 A similar claim is made by Lara Buchak: ‘We do not attribute faith to a person unless the truth or 
falsity of the proposition involved makes a difference to that person’ (2012, 226). 
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To see the religious response, let’s begin by supposing that, according to (1*), the 
proposition “God exists” is necessary for the person with faiths practical aims to be achieved. 
Note that even though the fictionalist also aims to acquire certain goods, her ends are 
temporal, or “this-worldly”. As such, if she discovered that God does not exist, she may feel 
a sense of disappointment, but it needn’t stop her from actively engaging in her religious 
practice. This is because she doesn’t need the proposition “God exists” to be true in order to 
attain her ends.  
On some pragmatist accounts of faith, engagement with religion is also pursued for 
temporal ends, in a similar way to the fictionalist. For example, William James claimed that 
‘religion offers itself as a momentous option. We are supposed to gain, even now, by our 
belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital good.’ (1919, 26). If we take these ‘vital 
goods’ that we can gain ‘even now’ to be the kinds of things the fictionalist wants to attain, 
then James’ view looks largely indistinguishable from fictionalism. However, this is not all 
James has to say on the matter. He adds shortly after that ‘if religion be untrue, we lose the 
good’. But how could we lose temporal goods, such as engagement in a welcoming religious 
community, if it turned out that the central claim that God exists is false? Presumably, James 
means to say that faith involves not only engaging in religion to attain temporal goods, but to 
attain eternal goods as well, including eternal life, answers to prayer, and relationship with a 
divine being.17 It is the attainment of eternal goods that do require the proposition “God 
exists” to be true, and if it’s not true, then we cannot attain the eternal goods that our faith 
pursues.  
So, according to the pragmatists, faith involves pursuing both temporal and eternal 
goods, the latter of which requires that God exist for their fulfilment. We can now say why a 
person of faith is affected by truth, whereas the fictionalist is not: because faith requires 
pursuing eternal, and not merely temporal goals, whose attainment requires certain 
propositions to be true. The modified condition thus reads: 
(1**) a positive cognitive attitude toward p, adopted as a means to attain both temporal 
and eternal goods. 
This condition is one that no fictionalist can meet since she does not pursue eternal goods 
through her engagement with a particular discourse. This is simply not the position the 
fictionalist takes. She is looking for a fall-back position from the fact that she does not 
believe certain claims to be true. This is one of using those claims to extract their temporary 
benefits. She is not engaging in the discourse in the hope that its claims are true, and that she 
might acquire something like eternal life. It is sometimes said that fictionalists treat the 
claims in a discourse as they merely would a fiction. Engaging in a discourse in the hope that 
God would grant eternal life or answer to prayer involves doing so in the hope that the claims 
of the discourse are true (rather than as you would a useful fiction), which stands in clear 
contrast to fictionalism. 
So, it looks like we have one way around the problem at hand. However, endorsing 
this solution opens up several serious problems. First, the solution does not work for faith 
toward non-religious content. Presumably there are many propositions one has faith toward 
                                                 
17 This is also the main motivating feature in Pascal’s Wager (see Jordan (2006), for an overview). 
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that do not have anything at all to do with pursuing eternal goods. Moreover, there are even 
some religions that do not seek eternal goods, but merely pursue temporal benefits. This may 
be of little consequence to those who consider religious faith to be distinct from non-religious 
faith, but we then lose the virtue of parsimony – of having a unified account of the 
propositional attitude. As such, faith in the religious domain will have different conditions 
from faith in other domains, and this will still be a faith of which fictionalists may be entitled. 
This issue is clearly not decisive if you think that faith is solely a religious attitude, but it 
certainly marks a drawback from using this solution for those who would like a parsimonious 
theory of our mental states. 
 A second issue is that, according to this new condition, someone can have absolute 
confidence and outright belief that God exists, and have a genuine and deep affection for 
God, yet not have faith. But this would seem absurd. Consider, for instance, the person who 
deeply loves God and believes that God exists with complete confidence. Nevertheless, she is 
temporarily unmotivated to pursue her religious commitments, perhaps due to depression or 
akrasia. Despite her temporary despondency, she retains both strong belief and passionate 
affection. We might think of her faith as dormant, for the time being at least, rather than lost. 
Yet, if we include a pragmatic condition in our analysis whereby faith requires the pursuit of 
any kind of good, be it temporal or eternal, then these kinds of people will be classified as 
faithless, where surely they should not be.  
This latter problem can be overcome, though, by specifying the analysis in the correct 
way, to only impose a pragmatic constraint on those who adopt a cognitive attitude 
voluntarily. There will, then, be a disjunction between those who believe, and those who hold 
a positive cognitive attitude for pragmatic reasons. As such, condition (1**) splits into 
(1a) a belief that p; or 
(1b) a positive cognitive non-doxastic attitude towards p, adopted as a means to attain 
both temporal and eternal goods;  
This final analysis overcomes the problem of the unmotivated believer, and shows how faith 
may be distinguished from fictionalism. 
Despite the resolution the new analysis brings to the problems at hand, it represents a 
mere “Pyrrhic victory” for NDT. This is for two important reasons. First, it lacks the virtue of 
a unified account of propositional faith. We will need other solutions to overcome the 
fictionalism problem for faith toward non-religious content. Second, the need to disjoin the 
two kinds of cognitive attitude – doxastic from non-doxastic – draws out the stark 
phenomenological difference between doxastic and non-doxastic faith. The concern this may 
cause for advocates of NDT is that it appears as though we have two very different 
phenomena on our hands. Rather than having a cognitive condition that covers all kinds of 
cognitive attitude, we now have a doxastic condition, and a non-doxastic/pragmatic 
condition, which cover two very different sorts of attitude and religious response. In the 
former case, one’s faith is sustained over long periods of time, many doubts and much 
wavering. Despite this, the agent will retain her faith in virtue of her belief and positive 
evaluation. This allows for cases like the unmotivated believer, who fluctuates in her 
practical commitment to the object of her faith in a way that is quite consistent with peoples’ 
actual experiences. The difference this exposes when we consider faith from the non-doxastic 
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angle is that in those cases, when one must voluntarily adopt an attitude towards a 
proposition, she will be continually coming in and out of faith depending on her degree of 
commitment at a particular time. Given this, it seems as though these two approaches to our 
cognitive commitment look like entirely different things. The outstanding question, then, is 
this: if doxastic and non-doxastic faith are so different in terms of phenomenology, is one of 
them actually an imposter? Is one of them no faith at all? If the advocate of NDT wants to 
endorse (1a) and (1b) to distinguish faith from fictionalism, she incurs both of these costs.  
 
Conclusion 
What this essay has tried to make clear is that fictionalism presents itself as a counterexample 
to NDT when NDT does not specify why someone adopts a positive cognitive attitude. It is 
not entailed by the concept of such mental states that they be endorsed for any particular 
reason, other than to accomplish one’s aims. The problem is that one’s aims can vary. The 
fictionalist is concerned with usefulness – with yielding particular goods regardless of the 
probable or likely truth of the propositions accepted – whereas for faith, although utility is an 
important factor, so is the possible truth of the proposition  
Following this approach, though, comes with theoretical costs. We can no longer offer 
a unified account of propositional faith across domains, and we are forced into separating the 
analysis in such a way that it appears as though we are dealing with two kinds of faith. Are 
there other ways to prevent the attribution of faith to some fictionalists? Possibly, but none of 
which are obvious at this stage, and they may well face similar problems to the solution 
discussed here. If we want to avoid legitimising fictionalist faith, then I suggest that the 
problems encountered by the approach discussed here provides us with a reason to favour a 
purely doxastic account of propositional faith over NDT. This account would certainly offer a 
simpler resolution to the fictionalist problem.18 
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